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CHAPTER 11 
Land Use Planning Law 
JULIAN J. D' AGOSTINE and RICHARD G. HUBER 
A. ZONING 
§1I.I. Denial of variance: Judicial review. In Pendergast v. Board 
of Appeals of Barnstable,1 the Supreme Judicial Court determined 
that a reviewing court could only reverse a denial of a variance by a 
local board of appeals if one of two situations existed: (I) the variance 
was denied "solely upon a legally untenable ground" and the board 
stated that the variance would have been granted but for that ground; 
or (2) the decision not to grant the variance was "unreasonable, 
whimsical, capricious, or arbitrary and so illegal."2 This standard of 
review was based, first, upon the general concept of the proper scope 
of judicial review of an administrative decision and, second, upon the 
concept that no person has a legal right to a variance or a permit for 
an exception. For a number of years no case came before the Court 
that required more than a routine citation of Pendergast. In Mahoney 
v. Board of Appeals of Winchester,3 however, the Court found that 
the board's denial of a special permit was arbitrary and directed that 
the decision be annulled; a similar result was reached in Lombard v. 
Board of Appeal of Wellesley.· While these cases represented no ero-
sion of the Pendergast doctrine, they did reflect that the Court would 
give a more detailed consideration to the grounds given by boards of 
appeals for their decisions and would make a closer examination of 
the specific facts of the cases. . 
During the 1967 SURVEY year, Lapenas v. Zoning Board of Appeals 
of Brockton5 reflected the closer scrutiny the Court now seems to be 
giving variance and permit denial cases. Two property owners owned 
tracts of land, located almost entirely in Abington. Each tract, how-
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§1I.1. 1 1I111 Mass. 555, 120 N.E.2d 916 (1954), noted in 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§14.25. 
2 1I111 Mass. at 559-560, 120 N.E.2d at 919. 
s 1I44 Mass. 598, 183 N.E.2d 850 (1962), noted in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.6. 
4348 Mass. 788, 204 N.E.2d 471 (1965), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.11. 
51967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 8411, 226 N.E.2d 361. 
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ever, included a narrow strip located in Brockton in an area which 
was zoned residential. The landowners were denied variances to per-
mit the use of their narrow strips of Brockton land as access to their 
individual tracts located in Abington, which were both zoned and 
being used for commercial purposes. The Brockton board had denied 
the variances on the bases that the requirements of General Laws, 
Chapter 40A, Section 15(3), were not met and because such use for 
access to commercial property would derogate from the intent of the 
Brockton ordinance. The Supreme Judicial Court quickly disposed of 
the argument based upon the intent of the Brockton ordinance. Brock-
ton had no interest in the Abington land, and its interests in protect-
ing the residential areas across the road from the strips involved in 
the variance proceedings certainly would have been met by a variance 
that would keep those strips free of buildings. The Court stated: "We 
think that Brockton's zoning interests support no more than this."6 
Under the particular circumstances of this case, the Court did not 
feel it necessary to remand the case to the board to reconsider its de-
cision upon the basis of the corrected interpretation of the intent of 
the Brockton ordinance. While the board had not specifically stated, 
under the Pendergast formula, that it would have granted the vari-
ances except for the untenable ground of ordinance misinterpretation, 
the Court found that a refusal to grant them would now be capricious 
and arbitrary. Thus, a remand to the board for a decision that could 
only result in the grant of the variances would be a formality. Thus, 
a direct reversal would not infringe on the power of the local board 
to exercise its administrative discretion. This decision was fortified 
by the Court's determination that the petitioners could have success-
fully maintained an action to be relieved from the literal effect of the 
zoning ordinance.7 
When the Court, in Pendergast, stated that no person was legally 
entitled to a variance, it was correct in the purely literal sense. As 
evidenced, however, in Mahoney and again even more clearly in 
Lapenas, fact situations do exist in which a person is entitled to af-
firmative relief from the application of the zoning laws. It would ap-
pear ridiculous to remit such a person solely to actions for a declaratory 
judgment that the application of the local ordinance to his property 
was beyond the power of the board, when he had sought a variance 
and the Court determines that he is entitled to one. The Court's 
opinion in Lapenas recognized that, on the facts of the case, such a 
disposition would be hair-splitting of a hyper-technical nature. Thus, 
the Court now appears to be recognizing that one of the two stated 
bases for Pendergast - that no one is entitled to a variance - has lit-
tle meaning in some fact situations. Pendergast's continuing vitality, 
therefore, must depend upon the conventional limitations imposed 
6 Id. at 846, 226 N .E.2d at 364. 
7 Such an action may be brought under G.L., c. 185, §1(j 1/2), and G.L., c. 240, 
§14A. 
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upon judicial review of administrative decisions. This would seem to 
provide fully adequate protection to decisions of local boards of ap-
peals, which will continue to retain the usual discretion given to ad-
ministrative bodies, subject to the usual limitations of judicial review. 
§11.2. Non-conforming uses. The continuation of uses which do 
not conform to the appropriate zoning ordinance, when enacted, are 
expressly protected by the Zoning Enabling Act.1 If the traditional 
view is adopted that one of the major purposes of zoning should be 
to eliminate non-conforming uses,2 courts undoubtedly should limit 
strictly any modifications in non-conforming uses. Strict limitations 
will inhibit the ability of such uses to keep pace with technological 
and commercial changes; and thus will hasten the elimination of the 
non-conforming uses. In Town of Seekonk v. Anthony3 and Town of 
Wellesley v. Brossi,4 the Supreme Judicial Court appeared to adopt 
such a policy in strictly limiting expansion of non-conforming uses to 
improve the users' competitive position. 
The certainty that non-conforming uses are inevitably incompatible 
with the zoning plan, however, has suffered rather severe erosion. Most 
planners today recognize that the rather simple zoning patterns still 
prevalent in most communities tend unnecessarily to restrict non-con-
forming uses which are compatible with the objectives of the zoning 
plan, while correctly, in terms of planning objectives, restricting in-
compatible non-conforming uses. While not a factor recognized in the 
Enabling Actl> or in the usual local regulations, a determination of 
whether a given modification of a non-conforming use should be per-
mitted can most properly be made on the basis of compatibility. Thus, 
even a relatively major change in a non-conforming use should be per-
mitted if the use, as modified, is compatible with desirable zoning and 
planning objectives. Even a minor change in non-conforming uses, 
however, should be objectionable if the use, as modified, conflicts with 
zoning objectives . 
.-t The disposition of Morin v. Board of Appeals of LeominsterG sug-
gests that the Supreme Judicial Court is well cognizant of the desir-
ability of permitting modifications which are compatible with the 
zoning plan. The locus, owned by Camire, included a house and barn. 
In cold weather Camire ran a one-man printing concern in the house, 
and in warmer weather he ran the concern in the barn. The locus was 
zoned residential. In 1954, Camire received a so-called "variance" per-
mitting him to use his dwelling as a year-round printing office. In 
§11.2. 1 G.L., c. 4OA, §5. 
2 See Russian Hill Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals of San Fran-
cisco, - Cal. 2d -,423 P.2d 824 (1967), for a recent expression of this view, most 
authoritatively and originally stated in Bassett, Zoning§1O.5 (1936). 
3339 Mass. 49, 157N.E.2d 651 (1959), noted in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.2. 
4340 Mass. 456, 164 N.E.2d 883 (1960), noted in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.2. 
See also 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.12. 
I> G.L, c. 40A, §5. 
6 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 951, 227 N.E.2d 466. 
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1963, because of family growth, he sought and received a "variance" 
to modify the barn on the premises so that the printing business could 
be conducted therein, rather than in the dwelling where it had been 
conducted exclusively for the immediately preceding nine years. 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's holding that 
the so·called "variances" were in excess of the board of appeals' 
authority.1 Camire obviously had a non-conforming use for a one-man 
printing business on the locus, and the issue, therefore, was whether 
the barn could still be used for this business. The barn had been so 
used at the time of the adoption of the zoning ordinance and no pro-
vision in the ordinance terminated a non-conforming use for abandon-
ment. Thus the Court correctly concluded that the barn could still be 
used for the business, even after nine years of non-use. 
The use, by Camire, of an automatic printing press was also con-
tested. Although it was not clear whether the press had been in use 
when the zoning ordinance was passed, the Court found that the use 
of improved and more efficient instrumentalities in the pursuit of the 
non-conforming use did not affect the determination that the present 
use was a continuation of the originally permitted use. Such changes 
as may have occurred did not change the original nature and purpose 
of the business, and thus the strict limitations reflected by the 
Anthony8 and Brossi9 opinions were not in issue.lo 
Had the printing business in the present case constituted, in any 
sense, a serious breach of the zoning pattern or a near nuisance in 
the zoning district, the Supreme Judicial Court might well have 
reached another result. The adjoining landowner, however, could only 
testify that he was occasionally annoyed by a "thump" when the 
automatic press was in use. Thus the non-conforming use was not in-
compatible with the planning and zoning considerations affecting the 
area surrounding the locus. Limitations on the changes in the non-
conforming use, where the changes are of a relatively minor nature such 
as were involved in the Morin case, would serve no valid public pur-
pose and would result in the elevation of form over substance. 
§1l.3. Eminent domain: Conflicts between public uses. As has 
been noted in earlier SURVEYS,l the increased demand for land re-
quired to carry out new and extended public projects has created a 
number of conflicts when land devoted to one public use is sought 
for another public use. It appears that no single procedure for settling 
these disputes is suitable in all situations, but one may well wonder at 
the rather frequent necessity, in the Commonwealth, of having such 
1 See G.L., c. 40A, §15(3). For a discussion of the statutory requirements, see 1960 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.1. 
8 Town of Seekonk v. Anthony, 339 Mass. 49, 157 N.E.2d 651 (1959). 
9 Town of Wellesley v. Brossi, 340 Mass. 456, 164 N.E.2d 883 (1960). 
10 The Court found Town of Wayland v. Lee, 325 Mass. 637, 643, 91 N.E.2d 835, 
839 (1950), controlling on this issue. 
§11.3. 1 See 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.25; 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.15. 
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disputes settled by the courts. Certainly any efforts to improve the 
law of eminent domain in this Commonwealth should consider 
methods of settling such conflicts as one of the most important prob-
lems to be solved. 
Sacco v. Department of Public Works2 was an action brought by 
residents of the town of Arlington3 to enjoin the Department from 
filling a portion of Spy Pond in connection with the widening of 
Route 2. The lower court's decree dismissing the bill was reversed in 
the Supreme Judicial Court. The Court first noted that under the 
provisions of General Laws, Chapter 91, Section 19, great ponds can-
not be filled except "as authorized by the general court and as pro-
vided in this chapter [91]." The Court then restated the established 
doctrine that "plain and explicit legislation" is required before land 
devoted to one public use can be diverted to a second public use.4 It 
found no such authority in the general power, relied on by the De-
partment, to take "such public . . . lands . . . or parts thereof 
or rights therein ... as it may deem necessary .... "5 The Court also 
found that the proposed use as a highway was inconsistent with the 
present use as a pond, and, therefore, the Department could not rely 
on the doctrine that slight indications of legislative intent permit a 
taking for a consistent use. 
This policy of preserving one public use from encroachment by 
another, even if of equal or perhaps greater importance, is consistent 
with prior holdings, which the Department ingeniously attempted to 
distinguish.6 The decision, however, did not settle the issue except on 
the basis of priority of use. The Court may not have had any other 
reasonable choice, given the status of previous decisions and the statu-
tory framework within which the courts must operate. 
The problem, however, is in need of legislative solution. The legis-
lature presently confronts these questions on an ad hoc, case by case, 
basis. Determinations based solely on a particular agency's persuasive-
ness with the legislature, if this results in giving a blanket priority to 
that one agency, are not always ideal ones. Highways, for example, 
21967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1005, 227 N.E.2d 478. 
3 The issue of the plaintiffs' standing to bring this suit was raised in the pleadings 
but not pressed by the Department. The question of standing can be vital in a case, 
but it is often not raised. See §11.5 infra. For a discussion of standing in the urban 
renewal context, see 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.31. 
41967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1006. 227 N.E.2d at 479, quoting Higginson v. Treasurer 
and School House Commissioners of Boston, 212 Mass. 583, 591. 99 N.E. 523. 527-528 
(1912). 
5 Acts of 1965. c. 679. §l, incorporating by reference this quoted language from 
Acts of 1956, c. 718, §6. 
6 The Department attempted to distinguish Commonwealth v. Massachusetts 
Turnpike Authority, 346 Mass. 250, 191 N.E.2d 481 (1963), noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §13.15. and Appleton v. Massachusetts Parking Authority, 340 Mass. 303. 
164 N.E.2d 137 (1960), noted in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.9. The Court, how-
ever, apparently satisfied with its doctrines as enunciated in those cases, was un-
willing to accept the careful and clever distinctions made by the Department. 
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may be ideal land uses in certain areas, fully entitled to priority over 
competing land uses, whereas in other areas, their need for priority 
may be much more doubtful. Legislative guidelines that permit flexi-
bility appear to be necessary. Given the desirability of flexibility and 
having experts rule on these matters, decisions on these issues would be 
handled most appropriately by an administrative body, acting under 
legislative guidelines. 
The question of priorities between federal and state regulation of 
land represents another manifestation of this same question. In the 
1967 SURVEY year case of Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Bartlett,7 
the issue arose because the Commonwealth planned to take certain 
property of the Boston & Providence Railroad for its own transporta-
tion uses, terminating certain present passenger and freight uses of 
the line by the New Haven Railroad. Both railroads were in reorgani-
zation under the federal Bankruptcy Act. The district court rejected 
the Commonwealth's argument that the power of eminent domain 
is an inherent attribute of sovereignty subject only to the federal 
constitutional limitations of due process and just compensation. This 
result is consistent with Berman v. Parker,S in which the United States 
Supreme Court held that eminent domain and police regulations were 
merely two ways of exercising government power. Thus eminent do-
main is no more an attribute of state sovereignty than any police 
regulation and equally subservient to federal legislative regulation 
under the supremacy clause of the federal Constitution. The bank-
ruptcy court's consent to the taking was, therefore, held to be required. 
The district court also found that the proposed taking would amount 
to an "abandonment" under the Interstate Commerce Act,lI and, thus, 
the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission was also re-
quired. 
The result reached in Bartlett is unobjectionable, since it can be 
assumed that the federal regulation will consider the state's proper 
interests. The settling of disputes between federal and state govern-
ments, however, on the basis of federal supremacy, if inevitable in 
the judicial context, is unacceptable in the legislative context. Each 
type of case in which federal and state interests conflict requires a 
sophisticated balancing, not an unrealistic resort to a simplistic 
formula. The need to find solutions that consider priorities based on 
the actual relative importance of two conflicting policies has not been 
solved in a fully satisfactory way at any level of government. Solutions 
premised on priority of use or superiority of level of one government 
over the other can furnish, at best, only a framework for careful 
legislative solutions. Absent legislative guidelines, courts must fall 
back on these simple and often undesirable guides, which may work 
well in a fair number of cases but certainly not in all. 
7266 F. Supp. 390 (D. Mass. 1967). 
S 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
11 49 U.S.C. §1(18) (1964). 
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§1l.4. Amendments: Spot and piecemeal zoning. Once an area 
is zoned for certain restricted uses, landowners in the area gain a 
vested interest in the retention of the imposed limitations except to 
the extent the public interest requires a change.1 The interest of the 
landowners is the type of interest in land that is constitutionally pro-
tected by due process concepts. As a consequence, the rezoning of an 
area always presents not just the constitutional issues involved in an 
original zoning but also those raised by the requirement of protecting 
those interests generated by the original zoning. In addition, the basic 
constitutional and statutory requirement of uniform zoning for similar 
areas has made it necessary in many jurisdictions to show some form 
of material error in the original zoning, or a substantial change of 
conditions to justify rezoning.2 The basic policies reflected in these 
limitations are undoubtedly desirable, but an overly technical or 
overly preservative approach can prevent the adoption of desirable 
rezoning. In many situations the change of conditions involved may be 
minor or may not even exist, but more modern concepts of land use 
control may suggest that a zoning change is desirable. Consequently, 
Massachusetts, along with New York, has essentially rejected the doc-
trine that either a mistake or a change of condition is necessary to 
support an amendment to a zoning ordinance.3 The Supreme Judicial 
Court, in three opinions decided during the 1967 SURVEY year, con-
tinued its basic tendency to support rezoning if the grounds for such 
rezoning can be said to be reasonable. 
In Coleman v. Board of Selectmen of Andover,4 the petitioners 
sought a writ of mandamus to compel the enforcement of the zoning 
bylaw as it existed prior to the rezoning of one lot from residential to 
business use. The original zoning described the zones solely by means 
of a zoning map, at a scale of 800 feet to one inch. The boundaries 
of zoning areas were extremely difficult to determine and, for many 
years, the town officials had believed that this particular locus was in 
a business district. In connection with an appeal from the grant of 
a building permit for a business structure on this locus, it was de-
termined, in 1963, that the locus was in an area zoned for residential 
use. At a special town meeting in 1964 the locus was rezoned for busi-
ness in a separate warrant, other zoning changes and boundary delinea-
tions being made in another bylaw adopted at the same meeting. Land 
adjacent and similar to the locus was not rezoned. 
§11.4. 1 See Mitchell v. Board of Selectmen of South Hadley, 346 Mass. 158. 190 
N.E.2d 681 (1963). noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.2; Hodge v. Luckett. 357 
S.W.2d 303. 305 (Ky. 1962); I Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning. c. 27. 
pp. 6-8, 13-23 (3d ed. 1966). 
2 Wakefield v. Kraft. 202 Md. 136, 96 A.2d 27 (1953); Parsons v. Town of Wethers-
field, 135 Conn. 24. 60 A.2d 771. 4 A.L.R.2d 330 (1948); Smith v_ Board of Appeals 
of Salem, 313 Mass. 622, 48 N.E.2d 620 (1943). . 
3 Cohen v. City of Lynn. 333 Mass. 699, 132 N.E.2d 664 (1956); Levitt v. Incor-
porated Village of Sands Point, 6 App. Div. 2d 701. 174 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1958). aU'd, 
6 N.Y.2d 269, 160 N.E.2d 501 (1959). 
4351 Mass. 546, 222 N.E.2d 857 (1967). 
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The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Whittemore, found that 
new legislative action concerning the lot's classification was sustainable 
because of the past confusion over boundary lines and the good faith 
action taken in dependence upon the mistaken belief as to permitted 
uses. The Court also implied that the disputed change in the locus' 
zoning could be considered as part of the general redefinition of 
boundaries which was effected at the same town meeting. Since there 
was no showing that either the general redefinition of boundaries or 
the disputed rezoning of the specific locus was unreasonable, the Court 
upheld the amendment despite the fact that similar adjacent lots were 
not rezoned. 
It is doubtful if all courts would support the rezoning in the Cole-
man case, at least without requiring that it be considered part of a 
larger legislative decision to redraw and specify boundaries. Thus, 
under the rather narrow Maryland doctrines limiting rezoning, a re-
cent case very similar on its facts to Coleman held that rezoning be-
cause of a boundary map mistake was not permitted.5 On somewhat 
different facts, a recent Minnesota case also held that mistake in loca-
tion of a lot on a zoning map did not justify rezoning.6 In Massa-
chusetts, however, the Court has not required that "substantial 
changes in the locus" exist before authorizing a zoning change.'/' If 
zoning is to be a relatively flexible device to control land use and de-
velopment, the Massachusetts test of reasonableness is certainly prefer-
able to the approach of Maryland or Minnesota. 
Kennedy v. Building Inspector of Randolph} more clearly than 
Coleman, required an affirmation of the rezoning since a major change 
of conditions had occurred in the area since the time of original zon-
ing. The original zoning was unusual as it placed the periphery of a 
triangle of land near the city center in a residential zone and the 
interior of the triangle in an industrial zone. The factory located in 
the center of the triangle expanded so that its work force grew from 
28 to 1500 between 1951 and 1963. The locus rezoned was one lot on 
which a dwelling condemned by the local board of health had stood. 
The factory, upon obtaining the rezoning, had leveled the lot, land-
scaped it, provided an entrance to make fire equipment accessible to 
the factory from this direction, and installed a parking lot for 50 
cars. The industry's other land included parking for 500 cars, and 
thus a great number of employees had to park on the streets near the 
factory location. This entire triangular tract was also near the town 
5 Mark v. Crandell, 244 Md. 193, 223 A.2d 248 (1966). The Maryland doctrine 
requires either the showing of an error in the original zoning or a change of condi-
tions of considerable amount before rezoning is sustainable. Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 
Md. 136, 141, 96 A.2d 27, 29 (1953). The presumption of validity of the rezoning is 
thus very weak, even if it can be said to exist. 
6 Olsen v. City of Hopkins, 149 N.W.2d 394 (Minn. 1967). 
1 See Cohen v. City of Lynn, 333 Mass. 699, 132 N.E.2d 664 (1956). 
8 Kennedy v. Building Inspector of Randolph, 351 Mass. 550, 222 N.E.2d 860 
(1967). 
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center so that parking for civic and business purposes competed with 
the factory workers for the same limited number of street parking 
spaces. 
The Court found that the rapid growth of the factory itself con-
stituted a change of conditions which would support the rezoning. 
Provision of fire access and relief from traffic congestion clearly pro-
moted the public interest in the rezoning. The Court thus found that 
the town meeting did not exceed its powers in adopting the amend-
ment lessening the undesirable consequences created by the area's 
changed conditions. While one may regret the effect of these changed 
conditions upon the owners of residences on the periphery of the 
triangle, the rezoning of the locus will not change their position in 
any substantial way. 
In Van Sant v. Building Inspector of Dennis,9 the zoning bylaw 
amendment brought substantial portions of property near the locus 
under zoning use restrictions for the first time, but the locus was ex-
cluded and left unzoned. As the Court noted, this is a form of spot 
zoning in reverse, and it raises the same basic problems that are met 
in piecemeal zoning under an original zoning law.10 The question is: 
Does the imposition of substantial restrictions upon nearby property 
while leaving the locus free of these restrictions treat similar land in 
an unequal manner that is thus arbitrary and unreasonable?l1 
In 1964 the east side of the highway upon which the locus abutted 
was rezoned residential except for an area about 300 feet on each side 
of a side road that constituted the entrance to an open-air theater. 
Properties on the west side of the highway, upon which the locus 
faced, were also assigned a residential classification, but upon motion 
of the owner of the locus, his property was specifically excepted from 
the area so restricted. The lower court, on a petition for mandamus 
against the building inspector, seeking to require that he enforce the 
zoning use restrictions as to the locus, held that the amendatory bylaw 
was properly adopted and the locus was therefore correctly exempted 
from the residential use restrictions. 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. The factors which influenced 
the Court in its opinion included the existence of the theater road 
and a nearby road used as access to a golf course, the exemption from 
the residential zoning limitations of the property across the road from 
the locus, the use of the locus for the non-conforming purposes of 
house painting and other business purposes, and the fact that the 
zoning plan was adopted with knowledge of the physical characteris-
tics and general nature of the neighborhood. Since, considering these 
factors, the decision not to zone the locus could not be considered 
unreasonable, it was upheld. 
91967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 555, 225 N.E.2d S25. 
101 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning c. 26, pp. 1-2 (3d ed. 1966). 
11 Whittemore v. Building Inspector of Falmouth, SIS Mass. 248, 46 N.E.2d 1016 
(1943); Leahy v. Inspector of Buildings of New Bedford, 308 Mass. 128, 31 N.E.2d 
436 (1941). 
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From the legal standpoint the decision is unexceptionable. From 
the planning viewpoint, however, one may well question the entire 
pattern of the zoning amendment that was adopted. Why was the land 
on one side of the road near the theater entrance left unzoned while 
the land, including the locus, opposite it, apparently subject to the 
same effects from the theater, was zoned for residential purposes? 
Despite the possibility, under the Massachusetts Zoning Enabling Act, 
of zoning less than the entire community,12 were there any good rea-
sons for failing to establish a complete zoning pattern for the town? 
More facts are required before these and similar questions could be 
answered, but those facts available suggest that poor planning prac-
tice was reflected in a poor zoning bylaw. 
§11.5. Zoning: Aggrieved party. It is, of course, accepted law in 
the Commonwealth that a private party cannot sue directly to enforce 
zoning restrictions but must seek mandamus against the public officials 
responsible for enforcement.1 In turn, however, the party seeking 
mandamus is considered to be attempting to enforce a public right 
and the action is in the general public interest.2 Thus, unlike the law 
of a number of states, the person seeking mandamus against local of-
ficials to require them to enforce zoning regulations need not establish 
any particular special damages that are unique to his own property.3 
Damages, even if only similar to that suffered by the public generally, 
seem to constitute sufficient standing for a petitioner seeking this ex-
traordinary remedy. 
The zoning enabling act, however, permits an appeal in connection 
with the grant or denial of a zoning variance, special permit, or 
building permit. This right of appeal applies to persons aggrieved or 
to municipal officers or boards.4 While the Supreme Judicial Court 
has usually been generous in finding that a particular petitioner is 
aggrieved,5 it has imposed some limitations upon those who can appeal. 
12 Noonan v. Moulton, 348 Mass. 633, 639, 204 N.E.2d 897,901 (1965) (no require-
ment of comprehensive plan). Since there is no requirement that zoning be in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan, the Court has been able to sustain as zoning 
a bylaw with the sole content of forbidding use of a trailer as a home except in a 
licensed trailer camp. Town of Granby v. Landry, 341 Mass. 443, 170 N.E.2d 364 
(1960), noted in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.12. 
§11.5. 1 See Atherton v. Selectmen of Bourne, 337 Mass. 250, 257, 149 N.E.2d 232, 
236 (1958), noted in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§14.2, 14.5. 
2 Dresser v. Inspector of Buildings of Southbridge, 348 Mass. 729, 205 N.E.2d 724 
(1965), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.14; Brady v. Board of Appeals of 
Westport, 348 Mass. 515, 204 N.E.2d 513 (1965); Gamer v. Zoning Board of Appeals 
of Newton, 346 Mass. 648, 195 N.E.2d 772 (1964). 
11 See 3 Rathkopf, The Law of Planning and Zoning c. 66 (3d ed. 1966), for a 
general discussion of the state of the law. 
4 G.L., c. 40A, §13 (to boards of appeals), §21 (to Superior Court and Supreme 
Judicial Court). 
5 Vainas v. Board of Appeals of Lynn, 337 Mass. 591, 150 N.E.2d 721 (1958), noted 
in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§14.l, 14.9 n.8; Marotta v. Board of Appeals of 
Revere, 336 Mass. 199, 143 N.E.2d 270 (1957), noted in 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§§11.2, 33.3. 
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Under the old Boston zoning statute, the Supreme Judicial Court 
has held in Circle Lounge &- Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Bos-
ton,6 that a purpose of the zoning statute is to protect land values, 
not a proprietor's competitive position. Therefore, a competitor who 
attempted to challenge the introduction into a more restricted zone 
of a use permitted in the zone in which the competitor's property was 
located was not a "person aggrieved."7 The general concept is that 
a person aggrieved within the meaning of a zoning statute is one who 
suffers damage apart from that suffered by the general public and, 
further, these special damages must affect the value of the real property 
owned or occupied by the petitioner.s The status is not given to an 
individual merely because the value of the business he is operating 
on his property will be reduced. The policy underlying this rule is 
not difficult to find. Courts recognize that zoning, particularly of 
areas for commercial use, has a tendency to restrain trade because only 
a certain limited area of land is made available for these uses. The 
courts, thus, are careful to limit this undesirable zoning by-product 
by holding that property owners having these partial or complete 
business monopolies acquire "no vested rights to monopolies created 
by zoning laws or ordinances."9 
Although the issue was not contested in the Supreme Judicial Court, 
the question of whether the plaintiffs were aggrieved parties, and thus 
able to contest the grant of a special permit, was perhaps the most 
interesting aspect of Shoppers' World, Inc. v. Beacon Terrace Realty, 
Inc.1° In this case the three plaintiffs were a large shopping center 
corporation, leasing the land from an insurance company, a theater 
corporation that was leasing from the shopping center corporation cer-
tain land and buildings, and the theater corporation's parent corpora-
tion, guarantor on the theater corporation's lease. All were bound, 
under the terms of their own leases, to pay local real estate taxes on 
the premises occupied, and costs of care, maintenance and operation 
of their respective properties. They appealed from a decision giving 
the defendant realty company a special permit to construct two 
theaters, one "legitimate" and the other "motion picture." These 
theaters would be located on land in the same zoning district as the 
6324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949). 
7Id. at 432, 86 N.E.2d at 922-923. 
S 2 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning c. 40, p. 16 (3d ed. 1966). See 
Kyser v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Westport, 230 A.2d 595 (Conn. 1967) (ad-
joining landowner not an aggrieved party when minor variance from rear yard 
requirements is granted); Tyler v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Woodbridge, 145 
Conn. 655, 145 A.2d 832 (1958); ]ahnigen v. Staley, 225 A.2d 277 (Md. 1967). 
9 Cord Meyer Development Co. v. Bell Bay Drugs, Inc., 20 N.Y.2d 211, -, 229 
N.E.2d 44, 46 (1967). See also. on the issue of business competition constituting 
special damages, Hughes v. City of Peoria, 80 Ill. App. 2d 392, 225 N.E.2d 109 
(1967), in which the court found untenable objections by central business district 
businessmen to a rezoning of an area over three miles from the district as a shop· 
ping center. 
10 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1183, 228 N.E.2d 446. 
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plaintiffs' land. Both properties are in a highly commercial area and 
are at least 600 feet apart, across a divided highway. The lower court 
found that the shopping center corporation was an aggrieved party. 
If one examines the facts of the present case in the light of both 
general and Massachusetts precedent, the status of the petitioners as 
aggrieved parties is certainly open to question. The Circle Lounge &-
Grille case, although not decided solely on this issue, holds that the 
effect of increased competition is damnum absque injuria. In Shoppers' 
World it is difficult to see any special damages to the petitioners ex-
cept economic loss from increased competition. This does not seem 
on the facts, anymore than it did on the facts of Circle Lounge &-
Grille, to be the loss of real property value that will support a finding 
of special damage and thus the status of aggrieved person. 
§11.6. Procedure: Special permits. General Laws, Chapter 40A, 
Section 4, authorizes the granting of special permits by the board 
of appeals, city council, or selectmen as designated by the appropriate 
ordinance or bylaw. The designated body must hold a hearing before 
granting the special permit and before holding the hearing, must give 
notice as required in Section 17. Briefly, Section 17 calls for two 
notices in the local newspaper, the first to be given not less than four-
teen days before the hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court has re-
quired strict adherence to these sections, and this policy was continued 
in two cases decided during the 1967 SURVEY year. 
In Gallagher v. Board of Appeals of Falmouth,! the selectmen 
granted a special permit pursuant to Section 21 of the zoning bylaw. 
This bylaw was enacted prior to Chapter 40A, Section 4, and con-
tained less stringent notice requirements. The decision was brought 
to the board of appeals where the selectmen's action was affirmed. 
Four property owners appealed the decision to the Superior Court 
under General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 21, and the Court annulled 
the decisions of the selectmen and board of appeals. The Supreme Ju-
dicial Court, in affirming the lower court, held that the selectmen 
were exercising a zoning power under General Laws, Chapter 40A, 
Section 4. Although they had given notice pursuant to the bylaw, the 
notice failed to meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 17 of the 
enabling act. Consequently, the selectmen lacked jurisdiction to grant 
the special permit. Failure to give the statutory notice was not cured 
by the board of appeals hearing because where the town has given the 
power to grant special permits to the selectmen, the board of appeals 
has no jurisdiction in the matter. The Gallagher holding that statu-
tory notice requirements are mandatory for jurisdictional purposes 
was reaffirmed in Lane v. Selectmen of Great Barrington.2 
A second holding of Gallagher and Lane relates to the method of 
appealing from the selectmen's action in granting or denying a special 
permit. General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 13, permits review by a 
§11.6. 1351 Mass. 410, 221 N.E.2d 756 (1966). 
2 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 835, 226 N.E.2d 238. 
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board of appeals of an action by an administrative official. The Court 
in the above cases held that the selectmen were not acting in that 
capacity although they did act as enforcers of the bylaw. Accordingly, 
no appeal lay under Section 13. The proper method of review was 
to appeal to the Superior Court under General Laws, Chapter 40A, 
Section 21. 
The Gallagher and Lane cases, in requiring at least the minimum 
statutory notice, evince a greater solicitude for the public's rights than 
the older bylaws had. It would be advisable for local government coun-
sel to revise these bylaws to bring them into conformity with the pro-
cedural requirements of Chapter 40A. These decisions might also be 
commended for holding that appeal from the selectmen's decision lay 
to the Superior Court directly, rather than to the board of appeals 
first. This procedure will facilitate quick resolution of conflicts over 
special permits. On the other hand, bypassing the administrative 
process may unnecessarily add to the lower courts' burdens. Further, 
it creates, in a sense, a procedural trap for the unwary. Appeal to the 
Superior Court must be within twenty days of the selectmen's decision. 
If an invalid appeal is prosecuted to the board of appeals and twenty 
days expired during such appeal, the aggrieved party may not resort 
to Section 21. Review of the granting of a permit may then only be 
available by collateral attack.3 No review may be available for the 
denial of a special permit. 
§1l.7. Procedure: Appeal to Superior Court. Aggrieved parties 
may appeal the decisions of boards of appeals, municipal officers, and 
municipal boards to the Superior Court under General Laws, Chapter 
40A, Section 21. The procedure for perfecting the appeal is intricate 
in several respects. A bill in equity must be filed within twenty days 
after the decision from which the appeal is taken has been filed with 
the city or town clerk's office. A copy of the decision appealed from 
bearing the filing date of the decision and certified by the city or 
town clerk must be attached to the bill. Within fourteen days of the 
filing of the bill in the Superior Court, the petitioner must serve 
notice and a copy of the bill on the requisite parties, which include 
the original applicant, if he is not appealing, and the members of 
the administrative body making the decision. Within twenty-one days 
after entry of the bill, the petitioners must file an affidavit that the 
notice has been given. Lastly, notice of the filing of the bill in equity 
and a copy thereof must be given to the city or town clerk. Three 
cases decided during the 1967 SURVEY year raise the question: to what 
extent must this procedure be followed in order to obtain and main-
tain jurisdiction. 
In Muldoon v. Board of Appeals of Watertown,1 the petitioner had 
failed to follow the procedure of Section 21 in that (1) he did not join 
3 See Brady v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 348 Mass. 515, 518-521, 204 N.E.2d 
513, 515·517 (1965). 
§1l.7. 1351 Mass. 702, 221 N.E.2d 466 (1966). 
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the original applicant as respondent, and (2) consequently the affi-
davit did not show service on the original applicant. A year later, the 
original applicant moved to intervene and essentially to dismiss the 
bill. The Superior Court dismissed the bill and the Supreme Judicial 
Court affirmed, relying on language in the statute requiring dismissal 
of a bill where the affidavit of service is not filed in the requisite time 
period. 
The same defects were present in McLaughlin v. Rockland Zoning 
Board of Appeals.2 The petitioner, however, moved to add the original 
applicant and for an order of notice for personal service less than a 
month after the statutory time period had expired. On appeal from 
the granting of the motion, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion where the appeal was timely 
and no material delay in prosecuting the appeal had resulted. The 
Court reasoned that the purpose of the statute is to avoid delay. If 
the trial judge were required to dismiss timely appeals, for defects 
in procedure, the substantive issue might still be litigable by a man-
damus proceeding, but only after delay had resulted. Therefore, giv-
ing the trial judge discretion to allow curatory amendments effectuates 
the purpose of Section 21. 
The Court's holding prevents Section 21 from becoming a pro-
cedural trap for the unwary. On the other hand it lessens the incen-
tive for practitioners to exercise care in perfecting their appeals. 
Failure to comply with the intricate requirements is thus more likely, 
and wasteful litigation over these defects will continue. For example, 
in McLaughlin, the petitioner also failed to enclose a separate notice 
of the filing of the bill with the copy of the bill he sent to the town 
clerk. In Richardson v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Framingham}" the 
petitioner failed to attach a certified copy of the decision appealed 
from to the bill in equity. Instead, he attached a photocopy of the 
certified copy. The Court held in both cases that the notice purpose 
underlying these requirements was met by the methods used, although 
they were incorrect. Litigating such issues is wasteful of both the 
courts' and the parties' time. Although Section 21 is intricate, it clearly 
states what is required. Perhaps it would be better to require strict 
compliance. Practitioners would then be forced to discipline them-
selves. Wasteful litigation could be avoided. 
B. SUBDIVISION CONTROL 
§1l.8. Conditional approval of subdivision plan. Under Chapter 
41, Section 81M, the powers of the planning board are directed to be 
exercised with due regard for the provision of adequate access to all 
the roads in the subdivision by streets and ways that will be safe and 
convenient for travel. Further, the planning board must secure ade-
21967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 205, 223 N.E.2d 521. 
3351 Mass. 375. 221 N.E.2d !l96 (1966). 
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quate provisions for water, sewerage and drainage, as well as for the 
coordination of the ways in said subdivision with each other and with 
neighboring subdivisions and adjoining public ways. The planning 
board's concern, therefore, should not be limited merely to the laying 
out of ways and services within the subdivision, but also to the con-
nection of these ways and services with adjoining subdivisiom and 
public ways existing. 
As the Subdivision Control Law is a relatively new law in Massa-
chusetts, many ambiguities have yet to be resolved by the Supreme 
Judicial Court. The particular area that causes the greatest concern 
in the future development of a town or city as an entity is the extent 
to which a planning board may require a subdivider to design the 
ways within the subdivision so as to insure their logical connection 
with ways that may be built on adjoining land presently undeveloped. 
The legislature, in order to implement further the provisions of 
Chapter 41, Section SIM, enacted Section SIQ which directs that a 
planning board shall adopt reasonable rules and regulations relative 
to subdivision control. Prior to the adoption of such rules and regula-
tions, a hearing must be held; the hearing and notice requirements 
are set forth in the statute. The rules and regulations, in order to 
comply with Section SIQ, must contain detailed requirements as to 
the construction of ways and installation of municipal services. The 
statute further requires that the planning board, in establishing such 
standards, shall give due regard to the prospective character of the 
subdivision, including the prospective amount of travel and any other 
necessary adjustment. Lastly, in order to complete the administra-
tive powers given to the planning board by the foregoing sections and 
to insure a practical and reasonable administration, the legislature 
enacted Section SIR which authorizes the planning board, in any 
particular case where such action is in the public interest and not in-
consistent with the intent and purposes of the Subdivision Control 
Law, to waive strict compliance with its rules and regulations. 
Over the last few years, the Supreme Judicial Court has several times 
been called upon to construe Chapter 41, Sections SIM, SIQ and SIR. 
In Piper v. Planning Board of Southborough,1 the Court indicated that 
the procedures of Section SI are mandatory. A prospective subdivider 
must know, prior to the filing of his subdivision plan, what will be 
required of him in the way of street construction and installation 
services. A few years later, the Court in Castle Estates, Inc. v. Park and 
Planning Board of Medfield,2 relying on the Piper case, held that the 
planning board of Medfield could not condition its approval of a sub-
division on the subdivider's providing certain water supply and 
drainage where the board had failed to adopt regulations establishing 
requirements for water and drainage. 
An area of the Subdivision Control Law that has received very little 
§1l.8. 1340 Mass. 157, 163 N.E.2d 14 (1959). 
2344 Mass. 329, 182 N.E.2d 540 (1962). 
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attention from the Court is the extent to which a planning board can 
impose, as a condition of its approval, a requirement that the sub-
divider install or improve ways and services beyond the limits of the 
subdivision in order to improve the services to the said subdivision. 
In Town of Stoneham v. Savelo,3 the subdivider, as a condition to 
approval, agreed to complete and improve a substandard private way 
so as to afford better access to the subdivision. The Court held the 
subdivider bound by his agreement. 
A similar situation arose in Rounds v. Board of Water and Sewer 
Commissioners of Wilmington,4 where the planning board required, 
as a condition of its approval, that the subdivider install larger water 
mains in streets beyond the limits of the subdivision so as to insure an 
adequate water supply to the subdivision. The Court upheld the action 
of the planning board, not on the grounds that such conditions were 
reasonable and lawful, but rather on the grounds that the subdivider 
had a right to appeal such conditional approval of the subdivision 
under Chapter 41, Section BIBB, and in failing to do so, he was forever 
barred from raising this issue. 
In an earlier case, Daley Construction Co., Inc. v. Planning Board 
of Randolph,5 the subdivider filed a plan with the planning board that 
met all the requirements of the rules and regulations, including the 
installation of water pipes. However, the plan was disapproved on the 
sole ground that an acute shortage of water and pressure existed in the 
particular area. The subdivider appealed under Section BIBB. The 
Court, in finding for the subdivider, held that although the language 
of Section BIM directs the planning board to secure adequate pro-
visions for water, its power is limited to the installation of adequate 
water pipes and did not extend their powers to require the subdivider 
to provide adequate water supply and pressure. 
From the foregoing it appears that planning boards frequently con-
dition subdivision approval on the construction of ways and services 
within the subdivision for the benefit of future development of ad-
joining land and without the subdivision for the benefit of the sub-
division. Further, the Court has yet to resolve the validity of these 
conditional approvals where the board has set forth its standards in 
rules and regulations although the Daley case intimates a restrictive 
view of board powers. During the 1967 SURVEY year, the Court again 
had the opportunity to resolve the issues in Lyman v. Planning Board 
of Winchester.6 The developer filed a preliminary subdivision plan 
which covered seven and one-half acres of vacant land in an area that 
was already developed to the north and the east. The proposed sub-
division was bounded on the south and west sides by undeveloped 
land owned by an abuttor. The abuttor's land also had frontage on an 
3341 Mass. 456, 170 N.E.2d 417 (1960). 
4347 Mass. 40, 196 N.E.2d 209 (1964). 
5340 Mass. 149, 163 N.E.2d 27 (1959). 
61967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 461, 224 N.E.2d 442. 
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existing public way and would not, by necessity, need access through 
the proposed subdivision. The Winchester planning board made 
specific provisions in the rules and regulations for the projection of 
streets and services to the property line of adjoining land both de-
veloped and undeveloped. So far as pertinent to this case, the regula-
tions provided that in the instance of undeveloped adjoining property 
which, in the opinion of the planning board, is suitable for ultimate 
development, provisions shall be made for the proper projection of 
streets and services to the exterior boundaries of the subdivision at 
such size and grade as will allow future projection. In the preliminary 
plan, the subdivider, in accordance with the planning board's regula-
tions, provided for an extension of a proposed way including sewer, 
storm drainage and water lines to the abuttor's land, thereby affording 
direct access in all respects to the abuttor. The planning board, after 
reviewing the preliminary plan recommended an elimination of this 
access to the abuttor's land in view of the topography of the land. 
At the public hearing on the definitive plan, the abuttor objected to 
this denial of access to the proposed roads in the subdivision but the 
board approved the definitive plan. The abuttor then appealed to 
Superior Court. The trial judge found that the planning board's 
action was based on the fact that the grade of the road necessary for 
the connection would not be in the best interest of the town as being 
excessive and, further, that any method of solving the grade problem 
would seriously injure the proposed development. The trial judge 
also found that the expert engineering testimony presented at the trial 
supported the opinion and action of the planning board. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, without determining the validity of 
the road projection requirements as provided for in the rules and 
regulations of the Winchester planning board, and assuming such to be 
valid for the purpose of this decision, relied on the findings of the trial 
judge and held that such action by the planning board was reasonable 
and proper. To do otherwise would be an improper enforcement of a 
regulation that would serve no public purpose. Citing Barney and 
Carey Co. v. Town of Milton,7 the Court further stated that the 
planning board could properly rely on the provisions of Chapter 41, 
Section 8IR, and waive its own rules and regulations in any given 
instance where the application of such rules would be unreasonable. 
In view of the unusual engineering and topographical circumstances 
of this particular subdivision, the application of the rules could be 
found to be unreasonable. 
The Lyman case thus gives judicial sanction to the waiver by a 
planning board of their rules and regulations pursuant to the statutory 
provisions of Section 8IR, even in instances where such waiver denies 
access to an owner of undeveloped adjoining land who desires such 
access for future development. 
It seems clear from the Lyman case, that had the fact situation been 
7324 Mass. 440, 87 N.E.2d 9 (1949). 
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altered to the extent that the planning board required the projection 
of a way and services to the adjoining land, even though such was not 
feasible from an engineering and topographical standpoint, that the 
Court, upon the developer's appeal, would have held such action as 
an improper exercise of their rules and regulations. Consider, how-
ever, how the Court would have ruled if we further alter the 
hypothetical fact situation to the extent that the evidence established 
the reasonableness and feasibility of such connection. Assume also that 
such extension would not benefit the developer in any way, but rather 
would cause him the additional expense of construction and force him 
to dedicate a portion of his land for the extension of a way for which 
he will receive no compensation. Would this not violate his constitu-
tional rights to due process? We must await further decisions of the 
Court in this important area which, due to the meagerness of cases, 
is virtually undeveloped in Massachusetts. The lack of appeals is due, 
in large part, to the fact that a developer finds it more economical, 
from both a timing and financial standpoint, to agree to the conditions 
of the planning board rather than incur not only the additional ex-
pense in litigation, but the extreme time delay necessarily involved in 
such litigation. 
§1l.9. Legislation. General Laws, Chapter 41, Section 8IX, sets 
forth the procedure for modifying, amending, or rescinding definitive 
subdivision plans. As part of that procedure, the planning board must 
record the change. Acts of 1967, Chapter 248, amended this section by 
adding the requirement that the planning board must state in its 
notice that the change does not affect any subdivision lot or rights 
appurtenant thereto where the lot was conveyed or mortgaged in good 
faith for valuable consideration subsequent to planning board approval 
of the change. The register of deeds or the recorder of the land court 
is directed not to record the notice unless it contains this statement. It 
remains to be seen whether the required statement can effect a change 
as to any of the subdivision where one lot having a right to use all 
the ways shown on the pre-existing plan is conveyed or mortgaged in 
good faith. 
General Laws, Chapter 41, Section 81U, was amended during the 
SURVEY year by Acts of 1967, Chapter 567. Previously, the planning 
board had to secure the installation of municipal services and con-
struction of ways in the subdivision by (I) requiring a performance 
bond and/or (2) placing a restrictive covenant in each lot forbidding 
building upon or selling the lot prior to completion. The amendment 
permits the planning board to accept as security an agreement, between 
the developer, first mortgagee and board, that the first mortgagee shall 
retain sufficient funds, otherwise due the developer, to secure the 
requisite performance. 1£ the work is not completed, the funds shall 
be available for completion. 
The statute is progressive but may raise some problems. It appears 
that the agreement does not effect a binding assignment to the locality. 
Thus, in the event of bankruptcy of the developer prior to completion, 
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the locality may find it difficult to obtain the funds to complete the 
requisite performance. 
Another difficulty is that the phrase "otherwise due the developer" 
is unclear. It may refer to the total sum due on the mortgage or the 
sum due the developer at each stage of work completion. Since the 
usual mortgage calls for disbursement by the mortgagee in stages, it is 
probable that the amendment only authorizes holding back sums due 
at each stage. Thus, there may not be sufficient funds held back at all 
times during the agreement. The amendment, also, does not clarify 
who is to arrange for the completion, in the event of the developer's 
default. Supplementary agreements clarifying these and other ambi-
guities are desirable if the locality is to be fully protected using the 
procedure permitted by this amendment. 
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